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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20061068-CA 
v. : 
ANDREW E. HOOPER, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from his sentences following guilty pleas to automobile homicide, 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(3) (West Supp. 2005), 
and driving while under the influence and causing serious bodily injury, a third-degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6a-502 and41-6a-503 (West Supp. 2006). This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when, at sentencing, it considered 
a secondary semi-truck accident where that accident was foreseeable once 
defendant's accident caused a substantial back-up of traffic? 
An appellate court "'traditionally afford[s] the trial court wide latitude and discretion 
in sentencing.'" State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, \ 8, 40 P.3d 626 (quoting State v. Woodland, 
945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997)). A trial court's sentencing determination will not be 
reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. 
II. Did the trial court err in not striking references to the foreseeable semi-
truck accident in defendant's presentence investigation report? 
"Whether the trial court properly complied with a legal duty to resolve on the record 
the accuracy of contested information in sentencing reports is a question of law that [this 
Court] review[s] for correctness." State v. Johnson, 2006 UT App 3, | 6, 129 P.3d 282 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert, denied, 138 P.3d 589 (Utah 2006). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes, relevant to this appeal, are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (West Supp. 2005); 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (West Supp. 2006); 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-503 (West Supp. 2006); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 18, 2005, defendant was charged with two counts of automobile 
homicide, a second degree felony; two counts of driving under the influence (DUI) 
causing serious bodily injury, a third degree felony; one count of DUI causing bodily 
injury, a class A misdemeanor; one count of having an open container, a class C 
misdemeanor; and one count of driving the wrong way on a roadway, a class C 
misdemeanor (R. 1-3). 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State filed an amended information charging 
defendant with one count of automobile homicide, a second degree felony, and one count 
of DUI causing serious bodily injury, a third degree felony (R. 51-53). Defendant pled 
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guilty to both counts, and the State dropped the remaining charges (R. 47, 54-60). The 
court sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms of one to fifteen years for 
automobile homicide and zero to five years for DUI causing serious bodily injury (R. 68-
70). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 72-73). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The crimes. On June 18, 2005, defendant caused an automobile accident that 
directly resulted in the deaths of two individuals and serious injury to a third (R. 71:2-3). 
This accident also led to a second accident that resulted in the deaths of three more 
individuals and serious injury to six others (R. 71:4). 
Sometime before 5 p.m. on June 18, defendant drove his Toyota Corolla onto the 
off-ramp of 1-80 into on-coming traffic. Soon thereafter, defendant collided head-on with 
a Saturn carrying four people. The Saturn ended up on the right-hand side of the freeway 
outside the travel lanes, while defendant's Corolla remained on the left-hand side of the 
freeway, partially blocking the far-left travel lane (R. 71:3). 
Police arrived on the scene at 5:03 p.m. and shut down the eastbound travel lanes 
while emergency services responded to the accident (R. 71:2). The police found 
defendant in the driver's seat of his Corolla with a bottle of Listerine between his legs. 
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Defendant admitted he had been drinking. His blood alcohol content, taken about three 
and a half hours after the accident, registered 0.17 (R. 71:3). 
The police found three people trapped inside the Saturn. Rescue crews cut them 
out. One received only minor injuries, but the driver and front-seat passenger were 
airlifted to local hospitals with serious injuries. A fourth passenger, thrown from the car 
during the collision, was also seriously injured. The driver and front-seat passenger died 
several days later. Empty beer cans and an open bottle of liquor were found in the Saturn. 
The driver of the Saturn had a blood alcohol content of 0.15, taken about four hours after 
the accident (R. 71:3). 
By 5:30 p.m., traffic had backed up about 1.45 miles on the freeway. About that 
time, a semi-truck driver drove into the backed-up traffic, causing a collision involving 
nine vehicles. Of the 17 people involved in this second accident, three died and six 
sustained serious injuries. A blood test showed that the truck driver was not under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol (R. 71:4). In a separate proceeding, the truck driver was 
convicted on three counts of negligent homicide (R. 71:5). 
Defendant's case. Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to one count 
of automobile homicide and one count of DUI causing serious bodily injury in connection 
with his accident with the Saturn (R. 47, 54-60). A sentencing hearing was held on 
October 20, 2006; a presentence investigation report (PSI) was prepared for the hearing 
(R.71). 
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The PSI did not expressly recommend either concurrent or consecutive sentences 
(R. 71). However, it did recommend that defendant be committed to prison for the term 
prescribed by law (R. 71:1). The PSI included a factual summary of defendant's crimes, a 
summary of the truck accident and the resulting criminal charges against the truck driver, 
and a letter from one of the victims of the truck accident (R. 71:4-5, 9). The PSI also 
revealed that defendant, a 62 year old man, had a criminal history dating back to 1962 (R. 
71:5). Included in that history were multiple DUI and other alcohol-related convictions 
dating back to 1978 (R. 71:5-6). 
At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel addressed the PSI, 
stating that "there are certainly things I do not believe should be in the report, and I'm 
going to ask the Court to strike them" (R. 84:2, 18).1 Counsel first asked the court to 
strike that part on page 4 describing the truck accident (R. 84:3). Counsel argued that the 
reference to the truck accident was improperly included in the PSI because it was the 
truck driver, not defendant, who was responsible for that second accident (Id). The trial 
court responded, "I suppose that's one way of looking at it. If your client hadn't caused 
the other accident, traffic wouldn't have been stopped and I doubt if any other accident 
[would have occurred]" (Id.). Thus, the court ruled, "I'm not going to strike anything on 
page 4" (Id.). 
lA copy of the sentencing transcript is attached at Addendum B. 
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Defense counsel then asked the court to strike that part of page 5 summarizing the 
criminal case against the truck driver (R. 84:4). The court responded, "And you don't 
want that to be considered. I thought you did want that to be considered" (Id). When 
counsel said, "No, I think that was an intervening crime that was committed and has 
nothing to do with this case," the court agreed to strike that part of page 5 (Id). 
Defense counsel then referred the trial court to page 9 of the PSI, which included a 
letter from one of the victims of the truck accident. When counsel argued that the letter 
was "not appropriate in this report," the court responded, "I'm not changing that" (R. 
84:4). 
Finally, defense counsel indicated that he believed a victim of the truck accident 
intended to speak at the hearing (R. 84:4). Counsel objected in advance to that victim's 
statement because "[tjhey're not a victim in this case" (R. 84:4-5). The court responded, 
"I'm sorry, but I view this as linked. I don't think that [the semi-truck] accident . . . 
would have occurred but for your client's conduct" (R. 84:5). 
Defense counsel and the court then reviewed defendant's criminal history, which 
included five prior DUI arrests between 1978 and 1996. One DUI had been reduced to 
reckless driving, and there was no disposition available for another. (R. 84:6-7.) 
Defendant was convicted on the three other DUI charges (R. 84:8; R. 71:5-6). 
After reviewing defendant's record, defense counsel noted that, as to the current 
offense, defendant "has more remorse than any client I've ever[] had" (R. 84:9). When 
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the court responded, "And so he should," defense counsel replied, "Absolutely. He 
understands that, Judge, he does, he gets it" (R. 84:9). The court was not convinced: 
"Well, he hasn't gotten it because he's been engaging in the same drunken driving 
process since 1978" (Id). "I think our society has been way too lenient in slapping 
people's hands when they have multiple DUIs. I'm not going to do that" (Id). 
Defendant then addressed the court: "I am so sorry that it took this terrible tragedy 
to prove how rotten alcohol really is. [inaudible] that I promised everybody in heaven and 
on earth and in this courtroom today that I will never touch this junk ever again. I'm so 
sorry. Thank you" (R. 84:12). In response, the court asked, "Is that the same speech that 
you made before on your other priors? . . . I assume you said basically the same thing." 
(Id.). Defendant replied, "I probably did bec[au]se I feel the same way" (Id.). 
The court then heard from the victim of the semi-truck accident over defendant's 
objection (R. 84:13) and from the prosecutor. The prosecutor noted that "we agreed that 
we would ask that these run concurrently," but argued that defendant be sentenced to 
prison "in order for the protection of the community" (R. 84:16). The prosecutor noted 
all the lives affected by defendant's criminal conduct, including those involved in the 
truck accident (R. 84:16-17). Concerning the latter, the State concluded that "this was . . . 
a result of [defendant], whether or not we can charge this as a crime, I believe it is 
immaterial to the fact that it was his—it was his responsibility" (R. 84:17). 
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Defense counsel spoke last. Counsel noted, "we're not asking that [defendant] not 
go to prison" (R. 84:18). Rather, "the only issue" was whether defendant's sentences 
should "run concurrent or be consecutive" (R. 84:18). On that subject, the court noted 
that, although the PSI did not directly address the issue, "in my mind it's been addressed 
by the facts. We're not talking about one life, we're talking about three to five lives" (R. 
84:19). When defense counsel objected that "I think we're talking about two," the court 
replied, "As if two lives was not significant?" (R. 84:19). Defense counsel answered, 
"No, it is. That's why [defendant] is going to prison" {Id.). 
The court then responded: 
He'd be going to prison if it were a third degree felony and he 
hadn't killed anyone. I am tired of repeat DUIs. I'm tired of them. 
We have treated this serious crime as if it is nothing. And what we 
get is someone like this who wipes out all these vehicles, all these 
human lives and impacts so many people, and I don't know what 
would have changed if he'd been held accountable on others the way 
he should have been held accountable, but I know what's going to 
happen today. 
(R. 84:19). After then announcing that defendant's sentences would run consecutive! 
the court concluded: 
He'll be doing both sentences at the prison and it is my intention to 
write a letter to the Board of Pardons anytime he comes up for parole 
and indicate to the Board of Pardons that I don't think he ought to be 
released one day early. This is the most unconscionable, outrageous 
conduct I have seen in a long time. And what this tells me is that 
some people are just not capable of learning. It's as if he were 
carrying a loaded gun around and pointing it at people all the time 
and he's not going to change. This goes all the way back to 1978 I 
believe we decided, and this man—excuse me, 1962 is when his 
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record began. There was hit and run in '62, that could have been 
alcohol related, and the first DUI was in '78. This is an appalling 
record, an appalling scenario. These people who have lost family 
members will never be the same. So the sentence is not appropriate, 
it ought to be a greater sentence, but it's the maximum I can impose. 
(R. 84:20). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Issue I. Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering 
consecutive sentences by basing its decision largely on the semi-truck accident. 
Defendant asserts that, because the semi-truck accident was not a foreseeable 
consequence of defendant's original accident, evidence of the semi-truck accident was 
irrelevant and should not have been considered. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
First, nothing in the record supports defendant's contention that the trial court's 
decision was driven by the semi-truck accident. To the contrary, the record shows that 
numerous other factors—including defendant's DUI history and his failure to rehabilitate 
himself—weighed far more heavily in the court's decision. 
Second, although defendant's claim rests on the foreseeability of the semi-truck 
accident, defendant cites no authority for the proposition that, at sentencing, a court may 
only consider the foreseeable, not the unforeseeable, consequences of a defendant's 
crime. 
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Finally, even if a trial court may consider only the foreseeable consequences of a 
defendant's crimes at sentencing, both Utah case law and case law from other 
jurisdictions supports the conclusion that the truck accident here was foreseeable.. 
Issue II. Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it denied defendant's 
request to strike all references to the semi-truck accident from his PSI. Defendant's 
claim, however, rests on his erroneous contention that the trial court erred in considering 
the semi-truck accident at his sentencing. Because the trial court did not err in 
considering the semi-truck accident at sentencing, it also did not err in not striking 
references to that accident from defendant's PSI. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AT 
SENTENCING WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE SEMI-TRUCK 
ACCIDENT WHERE THAT ACCIDENT WAS FORESEEABLE 
ONCE DEFENDANT'S ACCIDENT CAUSED A SUBSTANTIAL 
BACK UP OF TRAFFIC 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering consecutive 
sentences because it based its decision "almost exclusively upon the harm caused by the 
semi-truck crash." Aplt. Br. at 10. According to defendant, the semi-truck accident "was 
not a foreseeable result of the [his] offense," but, rather, an "independent and unforeseen" 
act of a negligent driver that "constitutes a superseding cause of the semi-truck crash," 
"mean[ing] the defendant was not responsible for that crash." Id. Consequently, the semi-
truck accident and the injuries caused thereby were irrelevant to defendant's sentences 
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and the trial court erred in considering them when addressing "the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses." Id at 10, 15, 17 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
401(2)(2003) (setting out factors trial court must consider before imposing consecutive 
sentences). 
Defendant's claim fails on at least three grounds. First, defendant's initial 
premise—that the court's sentencing decision was based "almost exclusively upon the 
harm caused by the semi-truck crash," Aplt. Br. at 10—is mistaken. In fact, the trial court 
relied far much heavily on other compelling factors that supported its consecutive 
sentencing order. Thus, even if the trial court erred in considering the semi-truck 
accident, defendant cannot show that he was harmed by that error. 
Second, although defendant claims that a trial court may only consider the 
foreseeable consequences of a defendant's criminal conduct as "circumstances of the 
offenses," Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2), defendant cites no authority to support that 
claim. Thus, his claim fails as inadequately briefed. 
Finally, even if foreseeability were a prerequisite for considering the semi-truck 
accident at defendant's sentencing, Utah case law and case law from other jurisdictions 
supports a conclusion that the semi-truck accident here was foreseeable. Thus, even on 
the foreseeability issue, defendant's claim fails. 
A trial court deciding whether to impose consecutive sentences must "consider the 
gravity and circumstances of the offense, the number of victims, and the history, 
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character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code. Ann. § 76-3-401(2). 
However, trial courts have "'wide latitude and discretion'" in deciding whether to order 
consecutive sentences. State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 8, 40 P.3d 626 (citation omitted). 
"Sentencing requires such discretion because it 'necessarily reflects the personal 
judgment of the court.'" State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ffif 31-32, 25 P.3d 985 (citations and 
additional internal quotation marks omitted). 
Furthermore, although "'[t]he due process clause in both the United States and 
Utah Constitutions "requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and 
relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence,'"" State v. Patience, 
944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted), "so long as basic constitutional 
safeguards of due process and procedural fairness are afforded, the trial court has broad 
discretion in considering 'any and all information that reasonably may bear on the proper 
sentence,'" State v. Sweat, 722 P.2d 746, 746 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (citation omitted); 
see also State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1986) (holding that "trial judges may 
receive and consider a wide range of evidence concerning the defendant in fixing the 
penalty to be imposed for the crime committed"). 
A. Defendant's claim fails because his premise that the trial court's 
sentencing decision was based "almost exclusively upon the harm 
caused by the semi-truck crash" is mistaken. 
Defendant's claim fails, first, because nothing in the sentencing transcript supports 
his premise that the trial court "based its sentencing decision in large part upon the truck 
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crash." Aplt. Br. at 24. To the contrary, the trial court emphasized several other weighty 
factors in support of its consecutive sentences decision. Thus, even if the trial court erred 
in considering the semi-truck accident, defendant cannot show that he was harmed by that 
error. 
To demonstrate reversible error at sentencing, a defendant must show not only trial 
court error in the sentencing process, but also that the error was harmful. See State v. 
Honie, 2002 UT 4, \ 54, 57 P.3d 977 (noting, in death penalty sentencing context, that 
u[a]n erroneous decision by a trial court cannot result in reversible error unless the error is 
harmful") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "An error is harmful if it is 
such that absent the error, there is a sufficiently high likelihood of a different outcome." 
Id. "[T]he burden of showing a sufficiently high likelihood of a different outcome rests 
on the complaining party." Id, The complaining party can rarely make that showing 
where, even if the trial court erroneously relied in part on an improper factor, the trial 
court also relied on other "factors [that] weigh heavily in favor of consecutive 
sentencing." State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, f 51, 153 P.3d 804; see also State v. 
Yoder, 925 P.2d 534, 549 (Utah App. 1997) (holding that trial court's reliance on 
improper aggravating factor is harmless where additional aggravating factors supported 
sentence); State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1993). 
In this case, defendant, while under the influence of alcohol, drove on the wrong 
side of a freeway and crashed head-on into an on-coming car, killing two people and 
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seriously injured at least one other. Based on this accident alone, defendant was charged 
with two counts of automobile homicide, a second degree felony; two counts of driving 
under the influence (DUI) causing serious bodily injury, a third degree felony; one count 
of DUI causing bodily injury, a class A misdemeanor; one count of having an open 
container, a class C misdemeanor; and one count of driving the wrong way on a roadway, 
a class C misdemeanor (R. 1-3). Although defendant pleaded guilty to only one count of 
automobile homicide and one count of DUI causing serious bodily injury (R. 51-53.), 
nothing in the record suggests that defendant ever disputed that his criminal acts killed 
two people—not just one—or that he was guilty of the other charges (R. 84:passim). 
Notwithstanding "the gravity and circumstances of [these] offenses," Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-401(2), and a criminal history that includes four prior alcohol-related 
convictions and a lack of rehabilitation despite those convictions, defendant challenges 
his consecutive sentences of one-to-fifteen years for automobile homicide and zero-to-
five years for driving while under he influence and causing serious bodily injury, claiming 
that the trial court relied too heavily on the semi-truck crash in ordering those consecutive 
sentences. See Aplt. Br. at 24-25. 
Nothing in the sentencing transcript, however, supports defendant's contention that 
the trial court "based its sentencing decision in large part upon the truck crash." Aplt. Br. 
at 24. See State v. Sweat, 722 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah 1986) (affirming sentence where 
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"[t]here is . . . no clear indication in the record that defendant's sentence was based on 
[improper information]"). 
First, although defendant is correct in asserting that "[t]he sentencing court was the 
most adamant in insisting that the defendant herein was responsible for the truck driver's 
criminally negligent inattention," Aplt. Br. at 23, he is incorrect in suggesting that the trial 
court's views on that issue were the primary impetus for its sentencing decision. As the 
transcript reflects, most of the trial court's comments concerning the semi-truck accident 
came only in response to defense counsel's initial challenges to the PSI's references to the 
accident and to counsel's later attempts to re-assert defendant's position that he lacked 
any responsibility for it (R. 84:3, 4, 5, 13, 19). The fact that the court addressed the semi-
truck accident each time defendant raised it does not mean that the court's sentencing 
decision was driven by that accident. It means only that the court felt compelled to 
respond each time defendant attempted to avoid any responsibility for that accident. 
Indeed, had the court truly been as focused on the semi-truck accident as defendant now 
claims, the court would not have responded, as it did, to defendant's last claim that he had 
killed only two people, not five, by saying, "As if two lives was not significant?" (R. 
84:19). 
Nor does the trial court's decision to strike references in the PSI to the truck 
driver's criminal charges, but not the semi-truck accident itself, suggest, as defendant 
claims, that the trial court relied heavily on the semi-truck accident. See Aplt. Br. at 24 
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(asserting that "[especially telling is the court's ready agreement to strike from the [PSI] 
the paragraph describing the truck driver's three convictions based upon his negligence, 
but not the [PSIj's description of the semi-truck crash, fatalities and injuries, or the letter 
from the daughter of a man killed in the semi-truck crash") (emphasis in original). It was 
defendant, after all, who—even after the trial court indicated it would not strike 
references to the semi-truck accident itself—asked the court to nonetheless strike 
references to the truck driver's criminal case (R. 84:4). Moreover, before granting 
defendant's request, the trial court asked, "And you don't want that to be considered? I 
thought you did want it to be considered" (Id). Only after defendant confirmed that he 
wanted it stricken did the court grant his request (Id.). 
Thus, the trial court's rulings to retain references to the semi-truck accident and to 
strike references to the truck driver's criminal case do not, as defendant contends, reflect 
some insidious attempt by the court to hold defendant solely responsible for the semi-
truck accident. See Aplt. Br. at 24 (claiming "[transparent is the court's rationale 
underlying these decisions"). Rather, they reflect only defendant's desire to strike 
references to the truck driver's case even after the trial court had denied his request to 
also strike references to the semi-truck accident. 
Most fatal to defendant's claim, however, is that the sentencing transcript clearly 
indicates that the trial court's decision to order consecutive sentences was based, not on 
the truck accident, but on a plethora of other weighty factors. 
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Certainly, the court's decision was based in part on the fact that defendant's 
alcohol-related conduct killed people (R. 84:19 (responding to defendant's contention that 
he only killed two, not five people, court asking: "As if two lives was not significant?")). 
However, the court's decision was based primarily on defendant's long history of 
prior alcohol-related convictions (R. 84:6 (court indicating that "what's compelling to me 
is that he does have [four] prior DUIs"); R. 84:9 (court stating that "I think our society 
has been way too lenient in slapping people's hands when they have multiple DUIs. I'm 
not going to do that"); R. 84:19 (defense counsel acknowledging that loss of life is "why 
[defendant] is going to prison"; court responding, "He'd be going to prison if it were a 
third degree felony and he hadn't killed anyone. I am tired of repeat DUIs"); R. 84:20 
(court reviewing defendant's criminal record a second time, stating "[t]his is an appalling 
record")). 
And, the court's decision was also based on defendant's dismal prospects for 
rehabilitation (R. 84:9 (defense counsel suggesting that defendant "has more remorse than 
any client I've ever[] had" and that "[defendant] gets it"; court responding, "Well, he 
hasn't gotten it because he's been engaged in the same drunken driving process since 
1978"); R. 84:12 (defendant stating that he was sorry and promising "everybody in 
heaven and on earth and in this courtroom today that I will never touch this junk ever 
again"; court asking defendant, "Is that the same speech that you made before on your 
other priors?"; defendant responded, "Well, I probably did bec[au]se I feel the same 
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way"); R. 84:20 (court stating, "what this tells me is that some people are just not capable 
of learning"). 
In sum, even if the trial court did consider defendant's part in the semi-truck 
accident at sentencing, the record establishes that other factors weighed far more heavily 
in the court's decision. Thus, even if the trial court erred in considering the semi-truck 
accident, defendant cannot show that, absent that error, that "there is a sufficiently high 
likelihood of a different outcome." Honie, 2002 UT 4, f^ 54. Defendant's claim fails for 
lack of prejudice, therefore, even if the trial court's consideration to the truck accident 
was error. 
B. Defendant's claim fails because he provides no legal support for 
his contention that a trial court may consider only the 
foreseeable consequences of defendant's conduct, not the 
unforeseeable ones, at sentencing. 
In asserting that the trial court erred in considering the semi-truck accident at 
sentencing, defendant does not dispute the trial court's finding that the semi-truck 
accident would not have occurred but for his criminal conduct. See Aplt. Br. at 20 
(conceding that "defendant's offense herein constituted a link in the chain of events 
leading up to the semi-truck crash"). Rather, defendant contend that, even if the accident 
would not have occurred but for his conduct, the court may not consider it when 
reviewing "the gravity and circumstances of the offense, the number of victims, and the 
history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant" under Utah Code. Ann. § 76-
3-401(2), if it was not a foreseeable consequence of his conduct. See id, 
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To make his claim, defendant relies on case law defining the concepts of 
"proximate cause" and "sufficient intervening cause." As defendant notes, the 
"'uniformly recognized definition [of] proximate cause is the cause which through its 
natural and foreseeable consequence, unbroken by any sufficient intervening cause, 
produces the injury which would not have occurred but for that cause.'" Aplt. Br. at 17 
(quoting State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335, 338 (Utah 1980)). And, as defendant notes, a 
"sufficient intervening cause" is one that is both "'unforeseeable and one in which [the] 
accused does not participate.'" Id. (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1215 (Utah 
1993) (quoting 40 C.J.S. Homicide, at 363 (1991))). 
However, the "proximate cause" cases cited by defendant in support of his claim 
address foreseeability only in the context of whether a defendant may be held criminally 
or civilly liable for another's injury. See, e.g., Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1215-16; State v. 
Hamblin, 676 P.2d 376, 378-79 (Utah 1983); Hallett, 619 P.2d at 338; Bansasine v. 
Bodell, 927 P.2d 675, 676-78 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Brown, 854 A.2d 13, 21-23 
(Conn. App. 2004), cert, denied, 859 A.2d 930 (Conn. 2004); State v. Judge, 675 P.2d 
219, 226 (Wash. 1984). They do not address foreseeability in the context of whether 
injuries caused by a defendant's conduct may be considered at sentencing. 
Nor do the due process cases cited by defendant. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 856 
P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993); State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 117-19 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248-49 (Utah 1980); State v. Johnson, 2006 UT App 3, Tf 7, 129 
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P.3d 282; State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 388-90 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Rhodes, 818 
P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah App. 1991) United States v. Hack, 403 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Burgos, 276 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001); State v. 
McFadden, 638 S.E.2d 633, 634 (N.C. App. 2007). 
Nor does the plain language of section 76-3-401(2), which, on its face, is broad 
enough to encompass both foreseen and unforeseen consequences of a defendant's 
criminal conduct. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2); see also Sindt v. Retirement Bd, 
2007 UT 16, f 8, 157 P.3d 797 ('"Under our rules of statutory construction, we look first 
to the statute's plain language to determine its meaning.'") (citation omitted). 
Defendant's claim on appeal, therefore, rests on an assumption—that the terms 
"proximate cause" and "sufficient intervening cause" limit the consequences of a 
defendant's criminal conduct that a trial court may consider at sentencing to only 
foreseeable consequences—for which defendant provides no legal support. Such an 
assumption does not sustain a claim on appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring 
that defendant's brief "contain . . . citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
record relied on"); State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, 1f 22, 128 P.3d 1179 (holding that "[a]n 
adequate brief is one that fully identifies and analyzes the issues with citation to relevant 
legal authority") (citation omitted); State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, \ 12, 69 P.3d 1278 
(holding that, when appellate fails to present relevant authority, reviewing court will 
"decline to find it for him"); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 72 n.2 (Utah App. 1990) 
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(holding that appellate court "will not engage in constructing arguments 'out of whole 
cloth' on behalf of defendants") (citation omitted). 
Thus, defendant's claim that the trial court erred in considering the semi-truck 
accident because the truck driver's negligence was unforeseeable fails. 
C. Defendant's claim fails because, even if a trial court may only consider 
foreseeable consequences of defendant's conduct, the semi-truck 
accident was a foreseeable consequence of defendant's conduct. 
Even assuming arguendo that, under section 76-3-401(2), a trial court may 
consider only those consequences of a defendant's criminal conduct for which he was a 
proximate cause—i.e., that are foreseeable—the trial court did not err in considering the 
semi-truck accident here because it was foreseeable. 
As stated, the "uniformly recognized definition [of] proximate cause is the cause 
which through its natural and foreseeable consequence, unbroken by any sufficient 
intervening cause, produces the injury which would not have occurred but for that cause." 
State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335, 338 (Utah 1980). 
A "sufficient intervening cause" is one that is both "'unforeseeable and one in 
which [the] accused does not participate.'" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1215 (Utah 
1993) (quoting 40 CJ.S. Homicide, at 363 (1991)). It is a cause "'so extraordinary that it 
is unfair to hold [the] accused responsible.'" Id (quoting 40 CJ.S. Homicide, at 363 
(1991)); see also Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 488 (Utah App. 
1991) (holding that "'[a] superseding cause, sufficient to become the proximate cause of 
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the final result and relieve defendant of liability for his original negligence, arises only 
when an intervening force was unforeseeable and may be described with the benefit of 
hindsight, as extraordinary'") (citation omitted); State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 543 
(UtahApp. 1997). 
Not every "intervening negligent act," therefore, "automatically become[s] a 
superseding cause that relieves the original actor of liability." Godesky v. Provo City 
Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 545 (Utah 1984). "[I]f the subsequent negligent act is foreseeable to 
the prior actor, both acts are concurrent causes and the prior actor is not absolved of 
liability." Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 488; see also McBride, 940 P.2d at 543. In other 
words, "there can be more than one proximate cause of an injury so long as each is a 
concurrent contributing factor in causing the injury." Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 486. 
Thus, if a defendant, "by his wrongful conduct creates a condition of peril, his 
action can properly be found to be the proximate cause of a resulting injury, even though 
later events which combined to cause the injury may also be classified as negligent, so 
long as the later act is something which can reasonably be expected to follow in the 
natural sequence of events." Hallett, 619 P.2d at 338-39; see also State v. Hamblin, 676 
P.2d 376, 379 (Utah 1983) ("'When a defendant negligently creates a risk of [injury] to 
another person, the fact that the person [was] actually [injured] as a result of the 
combination of that negligence plus some other contributing factor does not serve to 
exculpate.5") (citation omitted). Indeed, not even "the [intervening] criminal conduct of a 
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third person '. . . preclude[s] a finding of proximate cause if the intervening agency was 
itself a foreseeable act.'" Cruz v Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1257 
(Utah 1996) (citation omitted); see also Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 488. 
In asserting that the trial court erred in considering the semi-truck accident, 
defendant acknowledges that his offenses "constituted a link in the chain of events 
leading up to the semi-truck crash." Aplt. Br. at 20. He claims, however, that the court 
should not have considered the semi-truck accident because the truck driver's negligence 
was unforeseen and, therefore, a sufficient intervening cause that absolved him of any 
responsibility for the crash. See id. 
In support of his claim, defendant cites Bansasine v. Bodell, 927 P.2d 675 (Utah 
App. 1996). See Aplt. Br. at 20. In that case, the plaintiff, as guardian for P.K., sued 
Lang Rajsavong, the driver of the car in which P.K's father, a passenger, died. See 
Bansasine, 927 P.2d at 676. Rajsavong had upset another driver by driving aggressively 
and using obscene hand gestures. Id. In response, the other driver took out a gun and 
shot P.K.'s father. Id. On appeal, this Court held that, under these facts, Rajsavong was 
not a proximate cause of the father's death. Id. at 676-78. As this Court explained, no 
reasonable juror could "find that defendant should [have] foresee[n] that another driver . . 
. would fire a gun into his car simply because he [was driving aggressively]." Id. at 677. 
Indeed, "[i]f such a response were so common as to make it foreseeable, the streets and 
highways of this country would be empty." Id. 
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Defendant asserts that Bansasine governs this case. See Aplt. Br. at 20. According 
to defendant, a "semi-truck driver, more than thirty minutes after the defendant's 
accident, failing to notice a 1.45 mile traffic jam on a clear sunny day, and plowing his 
truck into the rear of the stopped cars, is no more foreseeable than a driver firing a gun at 
another car because of rude behavior and obscene gestures." Id. 
Defendant's claim is untenable. Indeed, two other cases cited by defendant— 
State v. Hamblin, 676 P.2d 376 (Utah 1983) and State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 
1980), see Aplt. Br. at 17-18—defeat it. 
In Hamblin, the defendant was speeding on a wet road when he noticed that the 
traffic light he was approaching was yellow. See Hamblin, 616 P.2d at 377. Instead of 
stopping, Hamblin accelerated through the intersection. Id. About 200 feet later, 
Hamblin crashed into a van turning onto the road and killed the van's driver. Id. at 377-
78. At the time, Hamblin's blood alcohol level was .12; the van driver's was .10. Id. at 
378. After being convicted of automobile homicide, Hamblin appealed, asserting that the 
trial court should have instructed the jury "that they must find Hamblin to be the 'sole 
proximate case' of [the van driver's] death before they could find Hamblin guilty." Id. at 
379. The supreme court rejected Hamblin's claim, holding that "[t]he state, in a criminal 
case, is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's negligence 
was the sole proximate cause of the death." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Rather, "[w]hen a defendant negligently creates a risk of death to another 
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person, the fact that the person actually died as a result of the combination of that 
negligence plus some other contributing factor does not serve to exculpate." Id. (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). Any other contributing factor, such as the van 
driver's "negligence, if any, could only have been a concurrent cause and not a 
superseding one." Id. 
In Hallett, the defendant, after drinking alcohol, went outside and bent down a 
stop sign in Kearns. See Hallett, 619 P.2d at 337. The next morning, a woman, who did 
not see the bent-over stop sign, drove north into the intersection, was broadsided by an 
east-bound car and killed. See id. On appeal, the supreme court upheld Hallett's 
conviction for negligent homicide, affirming the trial court's finding that Hallett "should 
have foreseen that his removal of the stop sign created a substantial risk of injury or death 
to others." Id. at 338. In the process, the court rejected Hallett's contention that his acts 
were not the proximate cause of the victim's death because the record showed that she 
was driving negligently at the time of the accident. Id. The court held that, "where a 
party by his wrongful conduct creates a condition of peril, his action can properly be 
found to be the proximate cause of the resulting injury, even though later events which 
combined to cause the injury may also be classified as negligent, so long as the later act is 
something which can be reasonably expected to follow in the natural sequence of events." 
Id. at 339. 
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Both Hamblin and Hallett defeat defendant's claim that the truck driver's 
negligence was a sufficient intervening cause to absolve him of any responsibility for the 
semi-truck accident. Both cases assume that the existence of negligent drivers on Utah's 
roadways is a foreseeable event. See Hamblin, 676 P.2d at 379; Hallett, 619 P.2d at 339. 
In addition, both cases hold that, where the defendant creates a perilous situation on 
Utah's roadways, another driver's negligence is not a sufficient intervening cause to 
absolve the defendant of responsibility for the damages that result. See Hamblin, 676 
P.2d at 379; Hallett, 619 P.2d at 339. 
Hamblin and Hallett are consistent with holdings from other jurisdictions. See 
District of Columbia v. Carlson, 793 A.2d 1285, 1291 & n.5 (D.C. App. 2002) (upholding 
suit against city by pedestrian hit by negligent driver while crossing road at intersection at 
which traffic lights were not working; holding "the fact that the District did not respond 
to the inoperative light for almost eight hours made it highly foreseeable that a negligent 
driver might strike a pedestrian crossing the street during that time"); Derdiarian v. Felix 
Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666, 671 (N.Y. 1980) (upholding suit by employee against 
contractor after negligent driver drove through "single wooden horse-type barricade" set 
up around road work; holding that "[a] prime hazard associated with [the contractor's 
failure to adequately protect the job site] is the possibility that a driver will negligently 
enter the work site and cause injury to a worker" and "[t]hat the driver was negligent, or 
even reckless, does not insulate [the contractor] from liability"); Roberts v. Kettelle, 356 
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A.2d 207, 215 (R.I. 1976) (upholding suit by decedent estates against police officer hit by 
negligent driver while "driving slowly in the high-speed lane" of a major highway; 
holding that officer "could reasonably have anticipated that another vehicle being 
negligently driven at a rate of speed in excess of the maximum speed limit would 
approach him from the rear in the high-speed lane of an interstate highway"). 
All of these cases support the trial court's consideration of the semi-truck accident 
here. Defendant's criminal conduct—driving under the influence of alcohol the wrong 
way on an interstate highway—"create[d] a condition of peril" for other drivers. Hallett, 
619 P.2d at 339. Not only did his criminal conduct create a condition of peril for the car 
he actually hit, but also created a condition of peril for the drivers caught in the traffic jam 
that resulted from defendant's accident. 
Defendant's driving drunk on the wrong side of the freeway directly caused 
serious injury to three people, two of whom would later die (R. 71:3). One of those 
people had been thrown from the Saturn, but two required rescue crews to cut them out 
before they could be treated (Id.). And two of the victims' injuries required them to be 
airlifted to local hospitals (Id.). Given the gravity of the injuries inflicted by defendant's 
initial accident, the foreseeable consequence of that accident was that the highway would 
have to be closed for a substantial period of time and that traffic would be backed up as a 
result (R. 71:2, 4). And given the fact that the highway would be closed for a prolonged 
period of time, it was also foreseeable that another negligent driver would come upon the 
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backed-up traffic and wreak additional havoc. See Carlson, 793 A.2d at 1291 (holding 
that "fact that the District did not respond to the inoperative light for almost eight hours 
made it highly foreseeable that a negligent driver might strike a pedestrian crossing the 
street during that time"); Hallett, 619 P.2d at 338 (holding Hallett criminally liable for 
death of driver even though accident took place several hours after defendant had bent 
down sign and driver may have also been negligent). 
In sum, the truck driver's negligence was neither so unforeseeable nor "so 
extraordinary that it would be unfair to hold [defendant] responsible." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1215 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); McBride, 940 P.2d at 543; 
Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 488. Consequently, the trial court did not err in considering it at 
defendant's sentencing. 
II. WHERE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONSIDERING 
THE SEMI-TRUCK ACCIDENT AT SENTENCING, THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING REFERENCE TO THE 
ACCIDENT IN THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred "in concluding that the [PSI]'s 
attribution of harm from the semi-truck crash to defendant was accurate and relevant." 
Aplt. Br. at 30 (capitalization, holding, and underlining omitted). According to 
defendant, the trial court should have stricken all references to that crash from his PSI as 
irrelevant to his sentencing. See id. at 32. 
Section 77-18-1(6) governs disputes in presentence investigation reports. Under 
that section, "[a]ny alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which 
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have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be 
brought to the attention of the sentencing judge." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (West 
2004). If the parties are thereafter unable to resolve those inaccuracies, the trial court 
"shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record." Id. 
"[Compliance with this section 'requires the sentencing judge to consider the party's 
objections to the report, make findings on the record as to whether the information 
objected to is accurate, and determine on the record whether that information is relevant 
to the issue of sentencing.5" State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, t 33, 999 P.2d 7 (quoting State v. 
Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f 44, 973 P.2d 404); see also State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f 14, 6 
P.3d 1133; State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, \ 26, 94 P.3d 295. A violation of 
section 77-18-l(6)(a) requires a remand "to the trial court with instructions that it 
expressly resolve [defendant's] objections in full compliance with section 77-18-l(6)(a)." 
Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, \ 45; see also Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, ^ 31. 
In this case, the trial court folly complied with section 77-18-l(6)(a) in addressing 
defendant's objections to his PSI. Specifically, the trial court "considered] [defendant's] 
objections to the report, ma[d]e findings on the record as to whether the information 
objected to [wa]s accurate, and determine[d] on the record whether that information [wa]s 
relevant to the issue of sentencing.'" Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 33 (quoting Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 
1144). 
29 
Defendant's contention, therefore, is not that the trial court violated section 77-18-
l(6)(a) in addressing his objections to inclusion of the semi-truck crash in his PSI. 
Rather, it is that the trial court erred in determining that the semi-truck crash was relevant 
to his sentencing. As addressed in Point I supra, the trial court did not err in making that 
determination. The trial court also, therefore, did not err in not removing reference to the 
semi-truck crash from defendant's PSI. 
Finally, even if the trial court did err in considering the semi-truck accident at 
defendant's sentencing, and therefore also erred in not deleting reference to that accident 
in defendant's PSI, the proper remedy is not, as defendant contends, to remand the matter 
to the trial court to "re-determine the sentence absent consideration of the semi-truck 
crash and consequent harm based upon the corrected record." Aplt. Br. at 33. Rather, 
where, as here, references to the semi-truck accident had little, if any, effect on the trial 
court's sentencing decision, see Point LA. supra, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
decision and remand the matter "for the limited purpose of resolving [defendant's] 
objections to the [PSI] on the record as required by section 77-18-l(6)(a)." Veteto, 2000 
UT 62, f 16; Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ffif 34-35; Jaegar, 1999 UT 1, If 45 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
sentences. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED l £ _ July 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK ) 
Assistant Attorney General 
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§ 76-5-207. Automobile homicide 
(1) As used in this section, "motor vehicle" means any self-propelled vehicle and includes 
any automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft. 
(2)(a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if the person 
operates a motor vehicle in a negligent manner causing the death of another and: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the 
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of 
the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, %any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of 
operation. 
(b) A conviction for a violation of this Subsection (2) is a second degree felony if it is 
subsequent to a conviction as defined in Subsection 41-6a-502(2). 
(c) As used in this Subsection (2), "negligent" means simple negligence, the failure to 
exercise that degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or 
similar circumstances. 
(3)(a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if the person 
operates a motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner causing the death of another and: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the 
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of 
the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of 
operation. 
(b) As used in this Subsection (3), "criminally negligent" means criminal negligence as 
defined by Subsection 76-2-103(4). 
(4) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided by Section 41-6a-515 and the 
provisions for the admissibility of chemical test results as provided by Section 41-6a-516 
apply to determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this section. 
(5) Calculations of blood or breath alcohol concentration under this section shall be made in 
accordance with Subsection 41-6a-502(l). 
(6) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally entitled 
to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense. 
(7) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible 
except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
Laws 1985,1st Sp. Sess., c. 1, § 1; Laws 1988, c. 148, § 2; Laws 1993, c. 161, § 3; Laws 2002, c. 106, § 9, 
eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 10, § 2, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, c. 228, § 6, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 
2005, c. 2, § 301, eff. Feb. 2, 2005. 
§ 41-6a-502. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination 
of both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration 
(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state if 
the person: 
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical test shows that 
the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time 
of the test; 
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
(c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of 
operation or actual physical control. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 
milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) A violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to this 
section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6a-510. 
Laws 2005, c. 2, § 58, eff. Feb. 2, 2005; Laws 2005, c. 91, § 1, eft July 1 2005. 
§ 41-6a-503. Penalties for driving under the influence violations 
(1) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Section 41-6a-502 is guilty 
of a: 
(a) class B misdemeanor; or 
(b) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(i) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having 
operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
(ii) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of the offense; or 
(iii) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 years of age in the 
vehicle at the time of the offense. 
(2) A person convicted of a violation of Section 41-6a-502 is guilty of a third degree felony 
if: 
(a) the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as a proximate result 
of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
(b) the conviction under Section 41-6a-502 is within ten years of two or more prior 
convictions as defined in Subsection 41-6a-501(2); or 
(c) the conviction under Section 41-6a-502 is at any time after a conviction of: 
(i) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed after July 1, 2001; 
(ii) a felony violation of Section 41-6a-502 or a statute previously in effect in this state 
that would constitute a violation of Section 41-6a-502 that is committed after July 1, 
2001; or 
(iii) any conviction described in Subsection (2)(c)(i) or (ii) which judgment of conviction 
is reduced under Section 76-3-402. 
Laws 2005, c. 2, § 59, eff. Feb. 2, 2005; Laws 2005, c. 91, § 2, eff. July 1, 2005. 
PART 4. LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON SENTENCES 
§ 7 6 - 3 - 4 0 1 . Concurrent or consecutive sentences—Limitations—Definition 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the 
order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to 
each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutive-
ly with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecu-
tively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the 
number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if 
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and 
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, 
the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6)(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of 
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as 
provided under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death 
penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct 
which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, 
and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his 
initial sentencing by any other court. 
PUNISHMENTS § 76-3-401 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board 
of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been 
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if 
any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrent-
ly with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that 
provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of 
any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed 
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has 
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of 
where the person is located. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-401; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 7; Laws 1989, c. 181, § 1; Laws 
1994, c. 13, § 21; Laws 1995, c. 139, § 1, eff May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 283, § 1, eff. 
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5 P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 THE COURT: All right, let's do the Hooper case. 
7 MS. CASSELL: Your Honor, in the foyer are some of 
8 the victims. If I could get them. Also the victims have 
9 some children. I said that you may not let them be here, 
10 but-
11 THE COURT: If the children are quiet they're 
12 welcomed to be here. 
13 MS. CASSELL: Thank you. 
14 THE COURT: I'll let you get them before we start. 
15 Okay, this is the time set for sentencing in the 
16 matter of State v. Andrew Hooper, 051907365. This is the 
17 time set for sentencing. I have reviewed a pre-sentence 
18 report and an assessment - excuse me, that's on somebody 
19 else. I've reviewed the pre-sentence report twice now and 
20 read it very carefully. I'm conversant with its content. 
21 Did you have that same opportunity, counsel? 
22 MR. MISNER: We have, Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: All right. For the record, Mr. Misner, 
24 you're appearing on behalf of the defendant. 
25 Ms. Cassell, you're appearing for the state?4 
1 MS. CASSELL: I am, Your Honor, that's right. 
2 THE COURT: Are there any inaccuracies or omissions 
3 in the report? 
4 MR. MISNER: Your Honor, there are no inaccuracies. 
5 There are some things that aren't there but we will certainly 
6 point out to the Court as we go along. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Any legal reason known to you 
8 why we should not proceed to sentencing? 
9 MR. MISNER: No, Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: And you've gone over the pre-sentence 
11 report with your client? 
12 MR. MISNER: I have. 
13 THE COURT: I'm happy to hear your remarks. 
14 MR. MISNER: Your Honor, a couple of things before 
15 I really get started. There are no legal reasons why we 
16 should not proceed with sentencing today. I guess I am 
17 asking the Court to not sentence Mr. Hooper today because our 
18 request is going to be that the Court send him to the prison 
19 for a diagnostic. 
20 THE COURT: I respectfully decline. 
21 MR. MISNER: There are some things, although there 
22 are no errors, there are certainly things I do not believe 
23 should be in the report, and I'm going to ask the Court to 
24 strike them. 
25 THE COURT: What would those be? 
1 MR. MISNER: On page 4, Your Honor, the paragraph 
2 starting with the following information. 
3 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
4 MR. MISNER: Going to the end of that section are 
5 not relevant to Mr. Hooper's charges, his plea, or his 
6 sentencing. And just to explain I'm sure the Court's been 
7 through them. While this investigation is going on in this 
8 case, traffic is backed up because there are emergency 
9 vehicles on the road. 
10 THE COURT: Thanks to him. 
11 MR. MISNER: That's correct. A truck driver comes 
12 along and commits a crime. He does not stop at all, he's not 
13 trying to stop, rams into the back of the stopped traffic -
14 THE COURT: Yeah, and this is all because of your 
15 client. 
16 MR. MISNER: Well, it's because of the truck driver 
17 who's already been convicted in a trial. 
18 THE COURT: I suppose that's one way of looking at 
19 it. If your client hadn't caused the other accident, traffic 
20 wouldn't have been stopped and I doubt if any other accident 
21 [inaudible]. 
22 MR. MISNER: Basically it -
23 THE COURT: I'm not going to strike anything on 
24 page 4. 
25 MR. MISNER: Well, and everything else that I would 
1 ask the Court to strike I guess I just need to make a record 
2 of it. The next page, section D, investigator's comments, I 
3 would also ask the Court to strike it the exact same thing 
4 goes into that case and that sentence. 
5 THE COURT: What case? 
6 MR. MISNER: The case with the truck driver who 
7 committed a crime. 
8 THE COURT: And you don't want that to be 
9 considered? I thought you did want it to be considered. 
10 MR. MISNER: No, I think that was an intervening 
11 crime that was committed and has nothing to do with this 
12 case. 
13 THE COURT: I'll strike it on page 5. Anything 
14 else? I 
15 MR. MISNER: I believe the last thing is page 9, 
16 Your Honor, and that's collateral contacts is something that 
17 totally is with regards to that as well, and I believe it's 
18 not appropriate in this report. 
19 THE COURT: I'm not changing that. 
20 MR. MISNER: And I guess while we're on that same 
21 issue just to make a record, my understanding is that there 
22 is going to be somebody here who wishes to speak. 
23 THE COURT: I'm sure there are a number of people. 
24 MR. MISNER: Well, one in particular that's here as 
25 a result of that crime that was committed. They're not a 
1 victim in this case, there are no charges relating to that in 
2 this case, and I would object to -
3 THE COURT: I'm sorry, but I view this as linked. 
4 I don't think that Dalrymple accident, for want of a better 
5 way to expressing it, would have occurred but for your 
6 client's conduct. 
7 MR. MISNER: I think the State would disagree 
8 because they didn't charge Mr. Hooper with anything as they 
9 couldn't because it was another separate crime. I guess my 
10 best way to make a record, Your Honor, is to me it would be 
11 the same as if an officer had pulled you over for speeding 
12 and was at your window writing you a ticket and somebody came 
13 by and ran the officer over as he was writing a ticket -
14 THE COURT: No, I don't -
15 MR. MISNER: - and the officer's wife coming and 
16 testifying against you. 
17 THE COURT: I don't see a that way. 
18 MR. MISNER: That's it with regards to that, Your 
19 Honor. 
20 THE COURT: All right, what else would you like to 
21 say? 
22 MR. MISNER: Your Honor, the only things that were 
23 left out of the report which were made available and aware to 
24 the person writing the report, Mr. Hooper is on medication, 
25 he has a seizure disorder. He's been to several doctors, 
1 there's a medical history of it. They've been unable to 
2 determine what causes these seizures, he blacks out, his 
3 family has seen him have these seizures and the black-out 
4 periods afterwards. He has - there was another time he was 
5 investigated for a DUI because he was in a single car 
6 accident and he had a seizure basically and blacked out and 
7 he had been in an accident. They suspected a DUI. He did 
8 the test -
9 THE COURT: When was that? Was that 11/10/87? 
10 MR. MISNER: Your Honor, I'm not exactly sure. 
11 THE COURT: I need to know. 
12 MR. MISNER: It was not a DUI though, that's the 
13 point, is they did a test and he had no alcohol in his 
14 system. 
15 THE COURT: All right, well what's compelling to me 
16 is that he does have five prior DUIs. 
17 MR. MISNER: He has - I have a 1978 DUI, Judge, a 
18 1982 DUI, and a 1996 DUI. 
19 THE COURT: There's one in A86 that was reduced to 
20 reckless; there was one in '87 although it says no 
21 disposition known; and then there's one in A96. 
22 MR. MISNER: Yes, so we don't know about the A87 
23 one. It may very well be the one that was not a DUI. 
24 THE COURT: That's what I just asked. 
25 MR. MISNER: The '86 case is not a DUI, it's a 
1 reckless driving. 
2 THE COURT: It started as a DUI. 
3 MR. MISNER: The reason, I mean, what we're 
4 pointing out is that he does have a medical condition that 
5 has resulted in another accident. 
6 THE COURT: That results in DUIs? 
7 MR. MISNER: No, absolutely not. He in no way 
8 denies his history of having DUIs, Judge. 
9 THE COURT: Well, it certainly is coming across 
10 that way. What medical condition could contribute to these 
11 DUIs? 
12 MR. MISNER: None, none, Your Honor, none 
13 whatsoever. 
14 THE COURT: Then I don't know why it's relevant. 
15 MR. MISNER: It's only relevant to show what his 
16 current life situation is, which is one section in the 
17 report, it just doesn't include this information. And it's 
18 certainly not an excuse. He was under the influence at this 
19 time. He had a blood test. His blood alcohol level I 
20 believe was .15. 
21 THE COURT: That' right. 
22 MR. MISNER: We believe he did have a seizure as 
23 well and it may have been caused by the alcohol and it's not 
24 an excuse and it's not a defense. He does not remember this, 
25 the things he told the police afterwards were untrue as to 
1 where he was coming from, Wendover and that sort of thing. 
2 That sort of information is indicative that he probably had 
3 another seizure. As I say, he's not excusing that, it's not 
4 a defense because he had drank too much and he was well over 
5 the legal limit. 
6 He has obviously his last crime, his last arrest, 
7 his last charge is a DUI in 1996. He's been sober for some 
8 period as he indicated in the report, until he broke off a 
9 relationship in 2005. 
10 THE COURT: Well, I'm not certain that's true. All 
11 we know is that he hasn't had a conviction since ^96. 
12 MR. MISNER: Of any kind. Your Honor, I have 
13 personally been in the position of the victims in this case. 
14 I know what they're going through. I know what this is. I 
15 wasn't -
16 THE COURT: Have you lost somebody to death in a 
17 traffic accident where someone was a drunk driver? 
18 MR. MISNER: Yes, I have. 
19 THE COURT: I see. 
20 MR. MISNER: I wasn't sure I could handle this 
21 case. I met Mr. Hooper, I went to see how this would go. I 
22 wanted Mr. Hooper to be a monster. It would have been 
23 easier. He's not. 
24 THE COURT: Well, that depends upon your definition 
25 of a monster. 
8 
MR. MISNER: He's a sad old man who's an alcoholic. 
THE COURT: Who's killed people. 
MR. MISNER: He has and, in fact, when I first saw 
him in the hall today that's the first thing he did was start 
crying and said I have killed people and I've taken lives. 
There is no way he's a flight risk. There's no way he could 
go to trial. He could not deal with this issue. He has more 
remorse than any client I've every had. 
THE COURT: And so he should. 
MR. MISNER: Absolutely. He understands that, 
Judge, he does, he gets it. 
THE COURT: Well, he hasn't gotten it because he's 
been engaged in the same drunken driving process since 1978. 
MR. MISNER: And like many other people we get in 
here, Judge, it's the unfortunate thing of DUIs is that they 
don't get it until something like this happens and it's not a 
defense -
THE COURT: Well, and I think our society has been 
way too lenient in slapping people's hands when they have 
multiple DUIs. I'm not going to do that. 
MR. MISNER: And I certainly understand that, 
Judge, but he is not here asking you today to walk out of 
this courtroom. He understands what he's done. He's 
remorseful for it and he just wants the record to reflect 
exactly what is going on in his life and how he feels. He 
1 certainly, you know, understands what the Court is going to 
2 do today. He understands what's going on. I just want the 
3 Court to realize or to know that he is sorry, not like we 
4 usually say, he gets it. 
5 THE COURT: How can someone who kills people not be 
6 sorry? 
7 MR. MISNER: I've seen it. 
8 THE COURT: Well, okay, he's sorry. Is there 
9 anything else? 
10 MR. MISNER: Your Honor, just very briefly. It's 
11 not a defense, it's not an excuse, the difference between Mr. 
12 Hooper and another person who might be in here getting a 
13 sentence where this would be a normal DUI would be a second -
14 considered a second DUI for sentencing purposes. 
15 THE COURT: No, it wouldn't. 
16 MR. MISNER: In the two-year period this would be a 
17 class B DUI if nobody wasn't injured, Your Honor. The 
18 mandatory minimum would be 10 days, and we're not asking for 
19 that. The difference between somebody that gets 10 days and 
20 somebody that gets 1 to 15, and I won't say it's bad luck for 
21 Mr. Hooper, it's good luck for the person who happens to not 
22 get in an accident and kill somebody. Certainly no excuse, 
23 but just to make that distinction clear, if the driver of the 
24 other vehicle were alive, he would be standing before you 
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wasn't going ' 
COURT: But he didn't kill anyone. 
MISNER: He was a drunk driver as well. 
COURT: Yes, I understand that. He had a 
fact, he didn't kill anyone. 
MISNER: Well, I mean, somebody died. 
COURT: He didn't cause the accident. He 
the wrong way on a freeway. So let's not 
confuse the facts of this case. 
MR. MISNER: Well, I mean, and like I said it's no 
defense, there certainly was comparative negligence. 
THE COURT: It is no defense. 
MR. MISNER: He certainly was partially responsible 
for the accident. 
THE COURT: I cannot find that at all. 
MR. MISNER: He was traveling way in excess of the 
speed limit and did not avoid the head-on collision that a 
bus previously had. But it would be a DUI homicide. If 
you're driving drunk and somebody in your car dies -
THE COURT: You are trying to move the blame to 
someone else -
MR. MISNER: We're not. 
THE COURT: - but it's not selling well. 
MR. MISNER: We are not in any way, Judge, we're 
trying to show the difference between the end result is 
11 
1 what's going to control, and it's a sad thing. He does want 
2 to address the court, Judge. 
3 THE COURT: Yes. Mr. Hooper? 
4 MR. HOOPER: I wrote it all down. Can I just give 
5 it to you? I don't think I can -
6 THE COURT: I don't want it but you can read it to 
7 me if you'd like. 
8 MR. HOOPER: Can I read it? 
9 THE COURT: That's what I just said. 
10 THE DEFENDANT: I am so sorry that it took this 
11 terrible tragedy to prove how rotten alcohol really is. 
12 [inaudible] that I promised everybody in heaven and on earth 
13 and in this courtroom today that I will never touch this junk 
14 ever again. I'm so sorry. Thank you. 
15 THE COURT: Is that the same speech that you made 
16 before on your other priors? 
17 THE DEFENDANT: No. This is something I wrote 
18 lately. 
19 THE COURT: I assume you said basically the same 
20 thing -
21 THE DEFENDANT: Well, I probably did becuase I feel 
22 the same. 
23 THE COURT: But you -
24 THE DEFENDANT: I just thought I wouldn't be able 
25 to. 
12 
1 THE COURT: Would the State like to be heard, Ms. 
2 Cassell? 
3 MS. CASSELL: We would. Your Honor, prior to the 
4 [inaudible] I would ask in the courtroom present are Juan 
5 Martinez's family. I'm not sure that any of them even want 
6 to address the court. 
7 THE COURT: Would anyone of you like to speak 
8 briefly? The defendant is to move over to the jury box and 
9 we'll get the floor. 
10 MS. CASSELL: They have all spoken and I just don't 
11 think that they can talk today. However, also present, Your 
12 Honor, is Carl Studs who is the father of one of the women or 
13 people who was killed in the accident involving the truck. 
14 He would like to speak and he's also spoken with the family 
15 and -
16 THE COURT: Anyone who wishes to speak [inaudible]. 
17 MR. MISNER: Your Honor, just again for the record 
18 this involves that subsequent accident. We object, there's 
19 no standing. 
20 THE COURT: Well, once again I will say very 
21 clearly that none of this would have occurred but for your 
22 client's conduct. 
23 Yes, sir, I'd like to hear from you. 
24 MR. ?: I thank you for the opportunity. I live on 
25 a very short block or we did, there are eight houses on that 
13 
1 block. Two houses up from me, the father of our friend and 
2 neighbor was killed in that wreck. My house, my daughter was 
3 killed. Three houses down my daughter-in-law, which is my 
4 daughter was killed. Juan made mention when he came here one 
5 time, well, all of you together to be friends. We've been 
6 friends for years. I have no desire for Mr. Hooper to suffer 
7 physically or harm to him physically, but my understanding of 
8 incarceration is that people are put there because they're a 
9 danger to society or they cannot be - or they need 
10 rehabilitation. I don't believe that Mr. Hooper can be 
11 rehabilitated. It is my sincere belief that if he continued 
12 or was set free and let go today that again he would drive 
13 and drink. 
14 I don't know how many people may have told him you 
15 can't do that, you're going to hurt yourself, you're going to 
16 hurt somebody else. I believe he's a danger to society. I 
17 would ask the Court to extend the consecutive for him to be 
18 put away as long as possible to keep him off the roads. 
19 I again have, as I have met with the Martinezes 
20 they are left without a father. I realize Mr. Hooper has 
21 children that are concerned and care about him. I had a 
22 daughter, I no longer have her. 
23 J THE COURT: I'm so sorry, sir. 
MR. ?: She was a wonderful young lady, 2 9 years 24 
25 J old, she left a three year old and a three month old. She 
14 
1 was the sole support for that family. She was the assistant 
2 manager for Alpine City Planner and quite a young lady. I do 
3 not wish to have him harmed physically, but he cannot be on 
4 the streets. He cannot be driving. He needs to be placed 
5 where he has not - does not have that temptation of alcohol 
6 and automobiles together, and again I thank you for this 
7 opportunity. 
8 THE COURT: I thank you for speaking out. So sorry 
9 for your loss. 
10 MR. ?: I think of the Martinez family. They no 
11 longer have their father to direct them, to guide them, his 
12 physical and emotion support. Mrs. Martinez is a widow who 
13 no longer has her husband. 
14 And some comments were made about Mr. Hooper's -
15 not Mr. Hooper, Mr. Dalrymple. Mr. Dalrymple's a decent man. 
16 He has a conscience and his life has been destroyed. Was he 
17 guilty? Yes. He should have been [inaudible]. He wasn't. 
18 But he wasn't drinking, wasn't on drugs, and he wasn't 
19 speeding. It was a horrible accident. But anyway thank you, 
20 Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 
22 Would anyone else like to speak, and I urge you to 
23 take the opportunity now if you'd like to. I'd like to hear 
24 from you. 
25 MS. CASSELL: I don't think anyone else would like 
15 
1 to speak, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: All right. Ms. Cassell, I'm interested 
3 in your response. 
4 MS. CASSELL: Thank you, Your Honor. I became 
5 involve in this case, Your Honor, immediately upon right 
6 after it happened. It happened, I think on Father's Day and 
7 I screened it from the beginning. I have never met a more 
8 decent group of people than the victims of these cases. They 
9 are, to a person not vindictive, not hateful, and they have 
10 lost more than any of us can ever imagine. They've lost 
11 their fathers, their daughters, their children, their best 
12 friends, and not any of them are vindictive and I've been 
13 humbled by their - by them. 
14 Mr. Dalrymple (sic) should go to prison, period, 
15 Your Honor. We want him to go to prison. He should to go 
16 prison is for - we agreed with - and Mr. Misner will probably 
17 mention this, we agreed that we would ask that these run 
18 concurrently, but we would ask that he be sentenced to the 1 
19 to 15. That's what he should go to prison in order for the 
20 protection of the community. No one, not the [inaudible], 
21 not the Martinezes, not countless other people. This didn't 
22 just affect these two families, it affected the families of 
23 everyone killed, of everyone - there's a 16 year old girl, I 
24 don't even know if this was mentioned, there was a 16 year 
25 old girl who was injured in the trucking accident who was 
16 
1 paralyzed from the - probably 17 now - from the neck down. 
2 There are countless other people from Highway Patrol Troopers 
3 to those who stopped on the road to lend assistance that are 
4 affected by Mr. Hooper's crime. 
5 Regardless of whether they can say that it was a 
6 direct result or if it was an incident that happened on 1-80 
7 that was just a malay, talking with Highway Patrol Troopers 
8 who were choking back tears at our trial when Mr. Dalrymple 
9 was sentenced was the worst thing he had ever seen in his 
10 life. And this was - we feel a result of Mr. Hooper, whether 
11 or not we can charge this as a crime, I believe it is 
12 immaterial to the fact that it was his - it was his 
13 responsibility. 
14 Witnesses who came upon this who didn't - weren't 
15 even part of the accident, their lives will be affected 
16 forever. 
17 Your Honor, we would ask that Mr. Hooper go to 
18 prison for the protection of all so that this never happens 
19 again, at least with respect to him and maybe it sends a 
20 message to all those people who would drink and drive that 
21 sometimes this happens you'll go to prison and you'll go to 
22 prison for a long time because nobody deserves to have this 
23 affect their lives like it did and on that, Your Honor, we 
24 submit it. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you. 
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1 Mr. Misner, you're entitled to the last word. 
2 MR. MISNER: Thank you, Judge. Your Honor, I 
3 forgot there was one correction that I think we all need to 
4 point out. Count 2 is DUI causing serious bodily injury. I 
5 think that needs to be clear on the pre-sentence report that 
6 this is not a third degree DUI as they have indicated. 
7 THE COURT: I made that change. 
8 MR. MISNER: Thank you. 
9 Your Honor, I'd love to make myself feel better by 
10 brow beating Adult Probation and Parole but that's not going 
11 to help. 
12 THE COURT: Why would you brow beat them. I think 
13 you've kind of got the wrong target here. 
14 MR. MISNER: No, Judge, I mean - we all know what's 
15 going to happen here. 
16 THE COURT: It's AP&P's fault? 
17 MR. MISNER: No, absolutely not. We all know 
18 what's going to happen here today. We're not asking that Mr. 
19 Hooper not go to prison. We understand he is. I know Your 
20 Honor is not going to send for a diagnostic. The only reason 
21 I would like a diagnostic is so the prison would know what to 
22 do with him when he's there. But this case is clear what the 
23 sentence is going to be. What's the only issue for a pre-
24 sentence report in this case is should these be run 
25 concurrent or be consecutive. That's the only issue, and 
18 
1 it's not even addressed. 
2 THE COURT: I think it's addressed. 
3 MR. MISNER: They don't put it any where in there. 
4 THE COURT: Well, they may not address it, but in 
5 my mind it's been addressed by the facts. We're not talking 
6 about one life, we're talking about three to five lives. 
7 MR. MISNER: I'm not going to beat that anymore, 
8 Judge, I think we're talking about two. We would certainly 
9 ask -
10 THE COURT: As if two lives was not significant? 
11 MR. MISNER: No, it is. That's why Mr. Hooper is 
12 going to prison. 
13 THE COURT: He'd be going to prison if it were a 
14 third degree felony and he hadn't killed anyone. I am tired 
15 of repeat DUIs. I'm tired of them. We have treated this 
16 serious crime as if it is nothing. And what we get is 
17 someone like this who wipes out all these vehicles, all these 
18 human lives and who impacts so many people, and I don't know 
19 what would have changed if he'd been held accountable on 
20 others the way he should have been held accountable, but I 
21 know what's going to happen today. 
22 With reference to the automobile homicide, a second 
23 degree felony, he's sentenced to the maximum. He's sentenced 
24 to the indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years at the Utah State 
25 Prison. 
19 
1 In connection with the driving under the influence 
2 of alcohol or drugs causing bodily injury, a third degree 
3 felony, he's sentenced to the term of zero to five years, and 
4 that is to run consecutive to the 1 to 15. He'll be doing 
5 both sentences at the prison and it is my intention to write 
6 a letter to the Board of Pardons anytime he comes up for 
7 parole and indicate to the Board of Pardons that I don't 
8 think he ought to be released one day early. This is the 
9 most unconscionable, outrageous conduct I have seen in a long 
10 time. And what this tells me is that some people are just 
11 not capable of learning. It's as if he were carrying a 
12 loaded gun around and pointing it at people all the time and 
13 he's not going to change. This goes all the way back to 1978 
14 I believe we decided, and this man - excuse me, 1962 is when 
15 his record began. There was a hit and run in A62, that could 
16 have been alcohol related, and the first DUI was in ^78. 
17 This is an appalling record, an appalling scenario. These 
18 people who have lost family members will never be the same. 
19 So the sentence is not appropriate, it ought to be a greater 
20 sentence, but it's the maximum I can impose. 
21 He is to pay restitution in full to all the victims 
22 involved. The State has 30 days or 45 days to gather the 
23 information on that and the defense has 45 days to consider 
24 it and file any objection they may have and ask for a hearing 
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